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NIGERIA: Settlement Efforts //Nigerian officials seem to be preparing the public for the possibility that the UK-US proposals for Rhodesia and the five-power effort on Namibia may fail. The Nigerian Gov-ernment still gives qualified support to these initiatives, but it may be in the process of reevaluating its policy and could well seek ways to dissociate Nigeria from Western settlement efforts.// //The government is concerned that the failure of these efforts, with which it is strongly identified, might obstruct Nigerian desires to play a leading role in African affairs and give ammunition to domestic critics -- principally journalists, academics, and students--who are deeply suspicious of Western motives toward Nigeria and Africa generally.// //It is unclear what, if any, specific steps the Nigerians may envision. They have backed current settlement efforts as the last hope for a peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia and Namibia; they believe intensified armed struggle is the only alternative if negotiations break down. When called on by Western countries, particularly the US, the Nigerians have pushed the frontline states and nationalist groups to be more cooperative and flexible.// //Nigeria is deeply disturbed by the prospect of an internal settlement in Rhodesia. It is convinced that such a settlement would receive widespread acquiescence, including that of the UK, the US public, and some of the more conservative African states. The Nigerians fear Africa would then be split as it was over recognition of the Neto regime during the Angolan civil war.// //Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba, who could be made a political scapegoat by his colleagues on the ruling military council if the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia fails, strongly criticized the plan in a speech last week before the UN Security Council and evinced considerable suspicion of Western objectives in Rhodesia. He implied that the West had used the Malta talks with Patriotic Front leaders as an excuse to block Security Council action sought by Nigeria condemning the

| | idea of an internal settlement. Nigeria has an observer at the Malta talks and probably will evaluate its position again after the talks end later this week.// | |
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| 25X1 | //A leading Nigerian foreign policy adviser noted in a recent address that southern Africa is the touchstone of Nigeria's present good political relations with the US; his comments reflect the government's high expectations for US policies and belief that US intentions are genuine. He predicted that Nigerian relations with the US could easily cool again unless the US produced "desired changes" in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. | |
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| | USSR-POLAND: Brezhnev Reappears |
| | Soviet President Breshnev, who has apparently been suffering from the flu, reappeared in public yesterday. He and Premier Kosygin participated in a Kremlin conference with Polish Premier Jaroszewicz. A portion of the session was shown on Soviet television. Breshnev had made only one public appearance since 13 December; he presented awards to several of his colleagues in the Kremlin on 5 January. |
| | Jaroszewicz departed for home later in the day. His visit, one of the rather frequent meetings of senior Polish and Soviet officials, appears to have focused mostly on economic cooperation. |
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| NAMIBIA: Preparing for Talks | |
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| //South Africa has agreed to meet with the foreign ministers of the Western five-power contact group in New York on 11 and 12 February and to hold preliminary talks on 9 and 10 February. The South-West Africa People's Organization had earlier accepted an invitation to concurrent but separate talks. Reports that the Tanzanians may release disaffected SWAPO leader Andreas Shipanga and some of his followers on Sunday could remove a major stumbling block in the talks.// | |
| //South African Prime Minister Vorster told parliament on Monday that Namibia would receive its independence by the end of this year no matter what results from the talks in New York. Vorster said South Africa would not give in to "certain demands" by SWAPOpresumably a reference to SWAPO's insistence that all South African military forces be withdrawn from Namibia before elections are held.// | |
| //The contact group has proposed that 1,500 South African soldiers be allowed to remain in the territory confined to one or two bases. Vorster probably doubts that SWAPO will budge on this issue and hopes this will provide the excuse to portray the nationalist group as responsible for any breakdown in the talks.// | |
| //The SWAPO leadership still appears divided over the question of residual South African military forces. According to press reports, SWAPO is under considerable pressure from moderates within the organization as well as from Tanzania and Angola to show greater flexibility at the talks. SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma met with Angolan President Neto in Luanda last week and now is in Dar es Salaam.// | |
| //Neto's ability to influence Nujoma is de- rived from SWAPO's use of Angolan soil for sanctuary and base areas. | 25X |
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| | negotiations have been under way in Dar |
| , | s Salaam regarding the release of the SWAPO dissidents probably to a neutral country until pre-independence elections are |
|] | neld in Namibia. The British Government for some months has |
| 1 | peen trying to arrange the release of Shipanga, whose wafe is |
| • | diffish subject, and has agreed to admit him to the NK to |
| 3 | ceside.// |
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| | //Nujoma may not be aware of these negotiations |
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| CANADA: Fiber Optical System | |
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| //The selection by the Canadian provincial govern- ment of Alberta of a fiber optical communication link instead of one using conventional microwave or coaxial cable technology could have a significant impact on the growth of the fiber op- tical communications market. Such a market could reach \$1 bil- lion annually in the 1980s. US firms will participate in the project.// | |
| //Proponents of fiber optics had believed that it would take a few years for such a system to be cost competitive with other communications technologies. The provincial government may have chosen this system in part to demonstrate its independence from the Canadian Government and the Bell Northern Telephone System. Alberta's decision is likely to accelerate acceptance of fiber optical systems in other areas.// | |
| //The proposed 52-kilometer link will become the world's first major operational fiber optical communications system to be installed. It will begin in Calgary, Alberta and feed into the main Winnepeg-Vancouver link. The Harris Corporation of the US will supply system hardware and another US firm, Corning, probably will supply the optical fiber. Canada Wire and Cable will construct the system.// | |
| //Participation by Harris and Corning may help US firms offset an extensive Japanese effort to become the world leaders in fiber optical systems and technology. | |
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BRIEFS

| | Chad-France |
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| 25X1 | The US Embassy in Ndjamena reports that a Chadian reconnaissance aircraft carrying three French advisers and a Chadian was downed on Saturday by Libyan-supplied antigovernment rebels near Faya-Largeau, the government's main garrison in northern Chad. The fate of those aboard the downed aircraft is unknown. The Frenchmen, if captured, could be held for ransom by the rebels. |
| 25X1 | A second plane carrying three French officers and a Chadian Government minister was hit the next day by rebel anti-aircraft fire and crash-landed. The occupants were able to escape, but the plane was destroyed. |
| 25X1 | The incidents would undoubtedly cause a stir in France if the news is made public especially if hostages were taken. The French military role in the former colonies is not popular with the French public. The rebels' use of antiaircraft weapons puts Faya-Largeau under greater threat and will increase Chadian pressure on the US to fulfill a promise made last year to find ways to assist the struggle with the insurgents. 25X |
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| 3 | South Africa |
| 25X1 | South Africa's black high schools reopen this week amid confusion among student leaders on how to continue the fight against the inequities of their educational system. The |

cohesion among militant student leaders has crumbled in the wake of police repression. Many students, under community and parental pressure to forgo violence, are beginning to view "the revolution" in the long term and see their loss of education as a drawback.

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At a recent meeting in a large black township near Pretoria, moderate students who wish to end the boycott and more militant students determined to continue it could not agree on which direction to take. A similar dilemma exists in Soweto and other townships in the Pretoria-Johannesburg area. Black primary schools have reopened with few reports of trouble, and it appears that the student boycotts may not be as extensive as they were last year. The potential for student violence, however, still exists.

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